Divine command
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This article is about the meta-ethical theory. For the divine
command theory of happiness, see Positive
psychology.

See also: Divine judgment

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v

t

e

Divine command theory is a meta-ethical theory which
proposes that an action's status as morally good is equivalent to
whether it is commanded by God. The theory asserts that what is
moral is determined by what God commands, and that to be moral is to follow his
commands. Followers of both monotheistic and polytheistic religions in ancient
and modern times have often accepted the importance of God's commands in
establishing morality. Numerous variants of the theory have been presented:
historically, figures including Saint Augustine, Duns
Scotus, and Thomas Aquinas have
presented various versions of divine command theory; more recently, Robert Merrihew
Adams has proposed a "modified divine command theory" based on the omnibenevolence of God
in which morality is linked to human conceptions of right and wrong. Paul Copan
has argued in favour of the theory from a Christian viewpoint, and Linda
Zagzebski's divine motivation theory proposes that God's motivations, rather
than commands, are the source of morality.

Semantic challenges to divine command theory have been proposed; the
philosopher William Wainwright argued that to be commanded by God and to be
morally obligatory do not have an identical meaning, which he believed would
make defining obligation difficult. He also contended that, as knowledge of God
is required for morality by divine command theory, atheists and agnostics
could not be moral; he saw this as a weakness of the theory. Others have
challenged the theory on modal grounds by arguing
that, even if God's command and morality correlate in this world, they may not
do so in other possible worlds. In addition, the Euthyphro dilemma,
first proposed by Plato, presented a dilemma which
threatened either to leave morality subject to the whims of God, or challenge
his omnipotence. Divine command theory has also been criticised for its apparent
incompatibility with the omnibenevolence of God, moral autonomy, and religious pluralism,
although some scholars have attempted to defend the theory from these
challenges.

Contents

1 General form

1.1 Augustine

1.2 Scholasticism

1.3 Immanuel Kant

1.4 Robert Adams

1.5 Alternative
theories

2 Objections

2.1 Semantic
objections

2.2 Moral
motivation

2.3 Euthyphro
dilemma

2.4 Omnibenevolence

2.5 Autonomy

2.6 Pluralism

3 Divine command theory in
religion

4 References

5 Bibliography

6 External
links

General form[edit]

Various forms of divine command theory have been presented in the past by
philosophers including William Ockham, St Augustine, Duns
Scotus, and John Calvin. The theory
generally teaches that moral truth does not exist independently of God and that morality is determined
by divine commands. Stronger versions of the theory assert that God's command is
the only reason that a good action is moral, while weaker variations cast divine
command as a vital component within a greater reason.[1]
The theory asserts that good actions are morally good as a result of their being
commanded by God, and many religious believers
subscribe to some form of divine command theory.[2]
Because of these premises, adherents believe that moral obligation is obedience
to God's commands; what is morally right is what God desires.[3]

Augustine[edit]

Saint Augustine offered
a version of divine command theory that began by casting ethics as the pursuit
of the supreme good, which delivers human happiness. He argued that to achieve
this happiness, humans must love objects that are worthy of human love in the
correct manner; this requires humans to love God, which then allows them to
correctly love everything else. Augustine's ethics proposed that the act of
loving God enables humans to properly orient their loves, leading to human
happiness and fulfilment.[4]
Augustine supported Plato's view that a well-ordered
soul is a desirable consequence of morality; unlike Plato, he believed that
achieving a well-ordered soul had a higher purpose: living in accordance with
God's commands. His view of morality was thus heteronomous, as he believed in
deference to a higher authority (God), rather than acting autonomously.[5]

Scholasticism[edit]

John Duns Scotus, who proposed a variant of divine
command theory

Scholastic philosopher John Duns Scotus argued
that the only moral obligations that God could not take away from humans are to
love one another and love God. He proposed that some commandments are moral
because God commands them, and some are moral irrespective of his command.[6]
Duns Scotus argued that the natural law contains only what is self-evidently analytically true and that
God could not make these statements false. This means that the commands of
natural law do not depend on God's will; these commands were those found on the
first tablet of the Ten Commandments –
the first three, which consist of obligations to God. He suggested that the rest
of the Ten Commandments, and any other commandments God makes, are morally
obligatory because God commands them.[7]

Kelly James Clark and Anne Poortenga have presented a defence of divine
command theory based on Aquinas' moral theory.
Aquinas proposed a theory of natural law which
asserted that something is moral if it works towards the purpose of human
existence, and so human nature can determine what is moral. Clark and Poortenga
argued that God created human nature and thus commanded a certain morality;
hence he cannot arbitrarily change what is right or wrong for humans.[8]

Immanuel Kant[edit]

The deontological
ethics of Immanuel Kant has been
cast as rejecting divine command theory by several figures, among whom is
ethicist R.
M. Hare. Kant's view that morality should be determined by the categorical
imperative – duty to the moral law, rather than acting for a specific
end – has been viewed as incompatible with divine command theory.
Philosopher and theologian John E. Hare has noted that
some philosophers see divine command theory as an example of Kant's heteronomous
will – motives besides the moral law, which Kant regarded as
non-moral.[9]
American philosopher Lewis White Beck takes
Kant's argument to be a refutation of the theory that morality depends of divine
authority.[10]
John E. Hare challenges this view, arguing that Kantian ethics should be
seen as compatible with divine command theory.[9]

Robert Adams[edit]

Robert Merrihew Adams proposes what he calls a
"modified divine command theory"

American philosopher Robert Merrihew
Adams proposes what he calls a "modified divine command theory".[11]
Adams presents the basic form of his theory by asserting that two statements are
equivalent:

It is wrong to do X.

It is contrary to God's commands to do X.[11]

He proposes that God's commands precurse moral truths and must be explained
in terms of moral truths, not the other way around. Adams writes that his theory
is an attempt to define what being ethically 'wrong' consists of and accepts
that it is only useful to those within a Judeo-Christian context.
In dealing with the criticism that a seemingly immoral act would be obligatory
if God commanded it, he proposes that God does not command cruelty for its own
sake. Adams does not propose that it would be logically impossible for God to
command cruelty, rather that it would be unthinkable for him to do so because of
his nature. Adams emphasises the importance of faith in God, specifically faith
in God's goodness, as well as his existence.[12]

Adams proposes that an action is morally wrong if and only if it defies
the commands of a loving God. If cruelty was commanded, he would not be loving;
Adams argued that, in this instance, God's commands would not have to be obeyed
and also that his theory of ethical wrongness would break down. He proposed that
divine command morality assumes that human concepts of right and wrong are met
by God's commands and that the theory can only be applied if this is the
case.[13]
Adams' theory attempts to counter the challenge that morality might be
arbitrary, as moral commands are not based solely on the commands of God, but
are founded on his omnibenevolence. It
attempts to challenge the claim that an external standard of morality prevents
God from being sovereign by making him the source of morality and his character
the moral law.[14]

Adams proposes that in many Judeo-Christian contexts, the term 'wrong' is
used to mean being contrary to God's commands. In ethical contexts, he believes
that 'wrong' entails an emotional
attitude against an action and that these two uses of wrongness usually
correlate.[15]
Adams suggests that a believer's concept of morality is founded in their
religious belief and that right and wrong are tied to their belief in God; this
works because God always commands what believers accept to be right. If God
commanded what a believer perceived as wrong, the believer would not say it is
right or wrong to disobey him; rather their concept of morality would break
down.[16]

Michael Austin writes that an implication of this modified divine command
theory is that God cannot command cruelty for its own sake; this could be argued
to be inconsistent with God's omnipotence. Thomas Aquinas argued that God's
omnipotence should be understood as the ability to do all things that are
possible: he attempted to refute the idea that God's inability to perform
illogical actions challenges his omnipotence. Austin contends that commanding
cruelty for its own sake is not illogical, so is not covered by Aquinas'
defence, although Aquinas had argued that sin is the falling short of a perfect
action and thus not compatible with omnipotence.[14]

Alternative
theories[edit]

Paul
Copan argues from a Christian viewpoint that man, made in God's image,
conforms to God's sense of morality. The description of actions as right or
wrong are therefore relevant to God; a person's sense of what is right or wrong
corresponds to God's.[17]

We would not know goodness without God's endowing us with a moral
constitution. We have rights, dignity, freedom, and responsibility because God
has designed us this way. In this, we reflect God's moral goodness as His
image-bearers.

—Paul Copan, Passionate Conviction:
Contemporary Discourses on Christian Apologetics[17]

As an alternative to divine command theory, Linda Zagzebski has proposed
divine motivation theory, which stills fits into a monotheistic framework.
According to this theory, goodness is determined by God's motives, rather than
by what he commands. Divine motivation theory is similar to virtue
ethics because is considers the character of an agent, and whether they are
in accordance with God's, as the standard for moral value.[18]
Zagzebski argues that things in the world have objective moral properties, such
as being lovable, which are given to them through God's perception of them.
God's attitude towards something is cast as a morally good attitude.[19]
The theory casts God as a good example for morality, and humans should imitate
his virtues as much as is possible for finite, imperfect beings.[20]

Objections[edit]

Semantic
objections[edit]

Philosopher William Wainwright considered a challenge to the theory on
semantic grounds, arguing that "being commanded by God" and "being obligatory"
do not mean the same thing, contrary to what the theory suggests. He used the
example of water not having an identical meaning to H2O to propose
that "being commanded by God" does not have an identical meaning to "being
obligatory". This was not an objection to the truth of divine command theory,
but Wainwright believed it demonstrated that the theory should not be used to
formulate assertions about the meaning of obligation.[21]
Wainwright also noted that divine command theory might imply that one can only
have moral knowledge if one has knowledge of God; Edward Wierenga argued that,
if this is the case, the theory seems to deny atheists and agnostics moral
knowledge.[22]
Hugh Storer Chandler has challenged the theory based on modal ideas of what might
exist in different worlds. He suggested that, even if one accepts that being
commanded by God and being morally right are the same, they may not be synonyms
because they might be different in other possible worlds.[23]

Moral motivation[edit]

Michael Austin has noted that divine command theory could be criticised for
prompting people to be moral with impure motivations. He writes of the objection
that a moral life should be sought because morality is valued, rather than to
avoid punishment or receive a reward. This punishment and reward system of
motivation could be seen as inadequate.[4]

Euthyphro dilemma[edit]

Plato presents the Euthyphro dilemma in one of his
dialogues.

Main article: Euthyphro
dilemma

The Euthyphro dilemma was
proposed in Plato's
dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro. In the scene,
Socrates and Euthyphro are discussing the nature of piety when Socrates presents
the dilemma, which can be presented as the question 'Is X good because God
commands it, or does God command X because it is good?'[24]

Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because
it is loved by the gods?

—Plato, Euthyphro[24]

The Euthyphro dilemma can elicit the response that an action is good because
God commands the action, or that God commands an action because it is good. If
the first is chosen, it would imply that whatever God commands must be good:
even if he commanded someone to inflict suffering, then inflicting suffering
must be moral. If the latter is chosen, then morality is no longer dependent on
God, defeating the divine command theory. Additionally, if God is subject to an
external law, he is not sovereign or omnipotent, which would
challenge the orthodox conception of God. Proponents of the Euthyphro dilemma
might claim that divine command theory is obviously wrong because either answer
challenges the ability of God to give moral laws.[24]

William of Ockham
responded to the Euthyphro Dilemma by 'biting the bullet'. He
argued that, if God did command people to be cruel, then that would be morally
obligatory, proposing that the only limitation to what God can make obligatory
is the principle of
non-contradiction.[25]
Robert Adams
defended Ockham's view, noting that it is only a logical possibility that God
would command what we consider to be immoral, not an actuality. Even if God
could logically command these actions, he would not because that is not his
character.[8]
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann have
responded to the Euthyphro dilemma by appealing to the doctrine of divine simplicity, a
concept associated with Aquinas and Aristotle which suggests that
the substance and attributes of God are identical. They propose that God and
goodness are identical and that this is what makes his commands good.[26]

American philosopher William Alston responded
to the Euthyphro dilemma by
considering what it means for God to be morally good. If divine command theory
is accepted, it implies that God is good because he obeys his own commands;
Alston argued that this is not the case and that God's goodness is distinct from
abiding by moral obligations. He suggested that a moral obligation implies that
there is some possibility that the agent may not honour their obligation; Alston
argues that this possibility does not exist for God, so his morality must be
distinct from simply obeying his own commands. Alston contented that God is the
supreme standard of morality and acts according to his character, which is
necessarily good. There is no more arbitrariness in this view than accepting
another moral standard.[8]

Omnibenevolence[edit]

Leibniz, and
some more recent philosophers, challenged the theory because it seems to entail
that God's goodness consists of his following his own commands. It is argued
that, if divine command theory is accepted, God's obligations would be what he
commanded himself to do; the concept of God commanding himself is seen as
incoherent. Neither could God hold any virtues, as a virtue would be the
disposition to follow his own commands – if he cannot logically command
himself, then he cannot logically have any virtues. Edward Wierenga counters
this by claiming that whatever God chooses to do is good, but that his nature
means that his actions would always be praiseworthy. William Wainwright argues
that, although God does not act because of his commands, it is still logical to
say that God has reasons for his actions. He proposes that God is motivated by
what is morally good and, when he commands what is morally good, it becomes
morally obligatory.[27]

Autonomy[edit]

Michael Austin draws attention to an objection from autonomy, which argues
that morality requires an agent to freely choose which principles they live by.
This challenges the view of divine command theory that God's will determines
what is good because humans are no longer autonomous, but followers of an
imposed moral law, making autonomy incompatible with divine command theory.
Robert Adams challenges this criticism, arguing that humans must still choose to
accept or reject God's commands and rely on their independent judgement about
whether or not to follow them.[28]

Pluralism[edit]

Austin considers the view that, in a world of religious pluralism,
it is impossible to know which god's or religion's commands should be followed,
especially because some religions contradict others, leaving it impossible to
accept all of them. Within religions there are also various interpretations of
what is commanded. Austin notes that some of the responses to the autonomy
objection may be relevant, as an agent must choose whichever religion and
morality they judge to be correct. He argues that divine command theory is
also consistent with the view that moral truths can be found
in all religions and that moral revelation can be found apart from
religion.[29]
Heimir Geirsson and Margaret Holmgren argue against the view that different
religions can lead to the same God because some religions are incompatible with
each other (monotheistic and polytheistic religions have contrasting views of
divinity, for example, and some Greek or Nordic gods magnified human
weaknesses). They argue that determining which god should be listened to remains
a problem and that, even within a religion, contrasting views of God
exist – the commands of God in the Old and New
Testaments could seem to contradict each other.[30]

Divine command
theory in religion[edit]

Divine command theory features in the ethics of many modern religions,
including Judaism, Islam, the Bahá'í Faith,
and Christianity, as well as being a part of numerous older polytheistic religions.[31]
In ancient Athens, it was
commonly held that moral truth was tied directly to divine commands, and
religious piety was almost equivalent to morality.[32]
Although Christianity does not
entail divine command theory, it is commonly associated with it. It can be a
plausible theory to Christians because the traditional conception of God as the
creator of the universe supports the idea that he created moral truths. The
theory is supported by the Christian view that God is all-powerful because this
implies that God creates moral truths, rather than moral truths existing
independently of him, which could threaten his omnipotence.[1]

References[edit]

^ a
b
Martin 1993, p. 229

^
Geirsson, Holmgren 2010, p. 37

^
Austin, Michael (21
August 2006). "Divine Command Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Retrieved 3 April
2012.

^ a
b
Austin, Michael W. (21
August 2006). "Divine Command
Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 15 August 2012.

^
Connolly, Keller, Leever & White 2009, p.
24

^
Swinburne, Richard
(2007). Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy. Oxford University Press.
pp. 358–359. ISBN 978-0-19-921246-0.

^
Williams, Thomas (31 May
2001; substantive revision 23 December 2009). "John Duns Scotus". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 6 April 2012.  Check
date values in: |date= (help)

^ a
b
c
Austin, Michael (21
August 2006). "Divine Command
Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 3 April 2012.

^ a
b
Phillips & Tessin 2000, p. 263

^
Phillips & Tessin 2000, p. 264

^ a
b
Pojman & Rea 2008, p. 558

^
Pojman & Rea 2008, p. 558-9

^
Harris 2003, pp. 32–33

^ a
b
Austin, Michael W. (21
August 2006). "Divine Command
Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 August 2012.

^
Pojman & Rea 2008, p. 561-2

^
Pojman & Rea 2008, p. 559

^ a
b
Copan, Paul, and William Lane Craig. Passionate
Conviction: Contemporary Discourses on Christian Apologetics. Nashville,
Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2007. 91.

^
Baggett & Walls 2011, p. 258

^
Toner, Christopher (1
September 2010). "Zagzebski,
Linda Trinkaus. Divine Motivation Theory.(Book review)". The Review of
Metaphysics. Retrieved 25 August
2012.  – via HighBeam (subscription required)

^
Langermann 2011, p. 54

^
Wainwright 2005, p. 106

^
Wainwright 2005, p. 106-107

^
Chandler 2007, p. 185

^ a
b
c
Austin, Michael (21
August 2006). "Divine Command
Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 3 April 2012.

^
Dougherty, M. V.
(2011). Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas.
Cambridge University Press. pp. 163–164. ISBN 978-1-107-00707-9.

^
Harris, Harriet (2011).
God, Goodness and Philosophy. Ashgate Publishing. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-4094-2852-7.

^
Austin, Michael W. (21
August 2006). "Divine Command
Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 August 2012.

^
Austin, Michael W. (21
August 2006). "Divine Command
Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 August 2012.

^
Austin, Michael W. (21
August 2006). "Divine Command
Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 August 2012.

^
Geirsson & Holmgren 2010, pp. 37–38

^
Rae 2009, ch. 2

^
Kowalski 2011, p. 98

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theory.

Swinbure, Richard (1977). The Coherence of
Theism. Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-824410-X.

Wainwright, Williams (2005). Religion and
morality. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7546-1632-0.

External links[edit]

Divine Command Theory Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy

God
and Morality — a defence of the Divine Command theory.

Moral Argument and Divine Command Theory — links to
relevant on-line resources from Internet
Infidels

Morality & Religion I — dialogue by Peter J. King (a
PDF
file)

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